Population based resource allocation: The use of hybrid risk adjustment by Manuel García-Goñi et al.
Population based resource allocation: the use of hybrid 
risk adjustment
Manuel García-Goñi




Serveis de Salut Integrats Baix Empordà
Address for correspondence: Manuel García-Goñi, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 
Departamento de Economía Aplicada II. Campus de Somosaguas. 28223 Pozuelo de Alarcón, 
Madrid, Spain. Email: mggoni@ccee.ucm.es  Tel: +34913943235; Fax: +34913942457.
Keywords: health expenditures, hybrid risk-adjustment, morbidity, clinical risk groups.
Words in main text: 3963
JEL Classification: I18
* Title Page (showing Author Details)Population based resource allocation: the use of hybrid 
risk adjustment
Abstract
Objectives: The emphasis on integrated care implies new incentives that promote coordination 
between levels of care. Considering a population as a whole, the resource allocation system 
has to adapt to this environment. This research is aimed to design a model that allows for 
morbidity related prospective and concurrent capitation payment. The model can be applied in 
publicly funded health systems and managed competition settings.
Methods: We analyze the application of hybrid risk adjustment versus either prospective or 
concurrent risk adjustment formulae in the context of funding total health expenditures for the 
population of an integrated healthcare delivery organization in Catalonia during years 2004 and 
2005.
Results: The hybrid model reimburses integrated care organizations avoiding excessive risk 
transfer and maximizing incentives for efficiency in the provision. At the same time, it eliminates 
incentives for risk selection for a specific set of high risk individuals through the use of 
concurrent reimbursement in order to assure a proper classification of patients.
Conclusion: Prospective Risk Adjustment is used to transfer the financial risk to the health 
provider and therefore provide incentives for efficiency. Within the context of a National Health 
System, such transfer of financial risk is illusory, and the government has to cover the deficits. 
Hybrid risk adjustment is useful to provide the right combination of incentive for efficiency and 
appropriate level of risk transfer for integrated care organizations.
Abstract1
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1. Introduction
The design of the incentives in health care represents a continuous challenge. Beyond payment 
for services, improving resource allocation for populations is increasingly a new requirement for 
health care coordination. In order to avoid fragmentation, integrated care organizations have 
been created and capitation arrangements are crucial in this environment. As a consequence, 
researchers and health policy-makers are devoting efforts to develop and implement risk-
adjustment systems for capitation. Prospective Risk Adjustment using capitation payments is 
the approach that is being used for HMO in the United States Medicare system and a number of 
other countries as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and Israel [1-7]; through 
the use of different information sets, as demographic information or diagnosis information. The 
existence of asymmetric information in the predictability of total health expenditures between 
single payers (as Medicare) and insurers with prospective risk adjustment also produces 
incentives for risk selection by attracting profitable insured and avoiding the unprofitable ones
[8,9] In a context of publicly funded health insurance, the transfer of financial risk to public 
integrated care organizations is vanishing and they may allow inefficiency. Furthermore, 
because access to health care is guaranteed for everyone, risk selection cannot consist of 
avoiding high risk patients (those for which the integrated care organization expects losses) as 
in a private context, but benefit selection may apply in a subliminal way. Hence, the most 
important problem under a National Health System is to provide incentives for efficiency in the 
purchasing and provision and in order to do that, it is also necessary to avoid any potential 
incentive for risk selection.
Any Risk Adjustment tool allows also the use of ex post diagnosis information (concurrent risk 
adjustment) or ex post information on costs in the payment formula (risk sharing), as shown in 
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Van Barneveld et al. (1997) [10] or Van de Ven et al. (2000) [11]. The consequence is that it 
reduces the financial risk assumed by health providers, with the positive result of a decrease in 
the incentives for risk selection, but also the negative result of a decrease in the incentives for 
efficiency. The tradeoff between efficiency and risk selection can be articulated through a mixed 
payment system for total health expenditures started to be explored in the literature in the last 
decades [12, 13]. In the last years, a mixed or hybrid risk adjustment formula with both 
prospective and concurrent information with the aim of maximizing incentives for efficiency while 
minimizing incentives for risk selection has been proposed by Luft and Dudley (2004) [14] and 
Dudley et al. (2003) [15] for total health expenditures. The same methodology has also been 
applied for pharmaceutical expenditures [16].
The predictability of health expenditures is therefore a key issue for health policy makers given 
that the lower is the difference in the information between single payers and insurers or 
integrated care organizations, the lower incentives for risk selection and the higher incentives 
for efficiency through the use of risk adjustment [17]. Different studies have shown how the 
predictive power of both total health care expenditures [18-20] and pharmaceutical expenditures 
[21-23] is hugely improved through the use of diagnosis information under different systems. 
Also, it is a recognized fact that a significant proportion of health care expenditures is 
concentrated in a small percentage of the population [24]. Hence, it becomes crucial to 
understand the relationship between morbidity and health expenditures and its variation, in 
order to allocate health resources in a proper and efficient way at a population level.
The analysis of total health expenditures comprehends the provision of health services in all 
primary care, hospital care, and specialist visits. A proportion of total costs consist of 
pharmaceutical expenditures, whose variation has been studied in different studies [25,26].
Furthermore, incentives in the provision of total health services have also been analyzed in the 
literature [9].
Different risk adjustment strategies have been studied in the literature, from the conventional 
(using a linear regression approach with the available information to predict costs) to the optimal 
risk adjustment [27,28]. However, health policy makers have until now only used the linear 
regression specification in the conventional risk adjustment strategies, and in the literature [23] 3
is shown how for drug expenditures, the use of other specifications as “parametric” or “flexible-
parametric” models obtain very similar predictions than the simple linear regression model, 
which is simpler to interpret.
There are different information systems that have been developed to group patients by 
morbidity characteristics. Among others, the three most widely known are the Adjusted Clinical 
Groups (ACG) system developed at Johns Hopkins University [19], the Diagnostic Cost Group 
(DCG) family of models developed at Boston University [1], and the Clinical Risk Groups models 
[20,29]. A recent comparison of the different information systems has been provided by the 
Society of Actuaries (2007) [30].
In this paper we use individual data and analyze the relationship between total health 
expenditures and morbidity grouped with the CRG classification system for the population 
belonging to an integrated healthcare organization covered by the public health system in 
Catalonia, in the context of the Spanish publicly funded health system. The hybrid risk 
adjustment model is able to identify the expected and observed resources of the organization.
2. Data Sources
We use individual data on health expenditures and morbidity from an integrated healthcare 
organization, Serveis Sanitaris Integrats Baix Empordà (SSIBE), in Catalonia. The organization
provides publicly funded health services (hospital care, primary care, and long-term care) to the 
population in the county of Baix Empordà. The health providers included in the analysis are the 
Palamós Hospital, with 100 beds for acute patients and 50 for skilled nursing care, and four out 
of the five Primary Care Centers in the county (Palamós, Torroella, la Bisbal, and Palafrugell). 
The fifth Primary Care Center (Sant Feliu de Guixols) was excluded for incomplete data. 
Although most of the health care provision to citizens in that county is registered, they also may 
receive health services outside the organization. Data on health provision and costs from 
outside the organization were not available and are omitted from our analysis.
The information collected at SSIBE integrates both clinical activities and costs. Thus, it consists 
of a unique identification patient file for all encounters including primary care, specialized care, 
and inpatient services, and a decentralized activity file codified in ICD-9-CM by clinicians and 4
reviewed by documentalists. The identification of each encounter allows for the total health 
expenditures allocation at an individual base. Total health care expenditures include also 
pharmaceutical expenditures publicly financed by Servei Català de Salut (CatSalut) and private 
copayment. We use an anonymized database belonging to years 2004 and 2005 with a total 
population of 92273 citizens (89722 in 2004 and 90849 in 2005). 
Among the possible grouping systems to apply risk adjustment strategies, we use in this article 
the Clinical Risk Groups (CRGs) (version 1.2B). It is characterized by classifying individuals in 
mutually exclusive categories while preserving clinical significance, and taking into account co-
morbidities and severity levels [20]. From the three different models provided by the CRG 
software, we use the concurrent model.
For each patient we get a unique CRG as well as its corresponding aggregation in ACRG1, 
ACRG2 and ACRG3. In this paper we describe the population through the highest level of 
aggregation (ACRG3) and for the estimations we use the second level of aggregation ACRG2 
for the classification of patients in morbidity groups. This level of aggregation originally has 176 
mutually exclusive categories. However we slightly modify those into 82 mutually exclusive 
categories fully maintaining its clinical significance by joining patients belonging to different 
CRGs of the same category but with different levels of severity, in order to avoid over fitting in 
our estimation because of a very low number of patients in some groups.
The total health expenditures information utilized incorporates residents as well as other 
persons that received services from SSIBE. Also it includes resident people with charge to 
international agreements or people whom they have provisional authentication codes. As a 
consequence, we are unable to completely allocate all health care expenditures since a small 
proportion stems from citizens not belonging to the resident’s file.
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the sample. The population is almost equally 
distributed between males (50.56%) and females (49.44%), and the average total health 
expenditures has increased from 513.2 euros in 2004 to 559.68 euros in  2005, while average 
pharmaceutical expenditure has increased from 191.33 euros in 2004 to 207.86 euros in 2005. 
The same table also shows the distribution of CRG categories under the most aggregated 
classification system in the population (ACRG3). Thus, most of individuals (63574 representing 5
70.89% of the total population) belong to the healthy condition (with or without health 
expenditures), while the proportion of individuals is decreasing in the level of severity, and 
hence, only a few belong to the highest severity group which classifies to the catastrophic 
condition (170 patients representing 0.19% of the sample).
Because pharmaceutical expenditures are a part of total health expenditures, there are a lower 
proportion of consumers with zero total health expenditures than with zero pharmaceutical 
expenditure. Thus, in 2004, 22.4% of the population (20904 out of 89722) had zero health 
expenditures while 37.54% (33669 out of 89722) had zero pharmaceutical expenditure. In year 
2005, these proportions of patients with zero expenditure were of 20.93% (19014 out of 90849) 
in the case of total and of 47.40% (43054 out of 91849) in the case pharmaceutical 
expenditures.
3. Estimation Methods
In this paper we estimate prospective, concurrent, and hybrid risk adjustment models using 
different information sets (demographic or health status information provided by the CRG 
categories) in order to predict total health expenditures in the subsequent year. Our objective is 
to examine the predictive power of each model, how well they explain future cost, and provide 
implications in terms of the application of a hybrid payment formula in the incentives of 
efficiency and risk selection in the health provision within a National Health System. The basic 
model is provided by:
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The dependent variable, health expenditures in year t for individual i, is explained by some 
independent variables or risk adjusters (individual demographic characteristics and health 
status information). Demographic information is provided by twelve age-gender cells. 
Prospective risk adjustment models predict total actual health expenditures with information on 
demographic characteristics and clinical status condition in year t-1. Differently, concurrent risk 
adjustment models predict total actual health expenditures using demographic and actual 
information on clinical status. Hybrid risk adjustment models combine both prospective and 
concurrent models. Pure prospective models promote incentives for efficiency but they are 6
unable to avoid risk selection. Differently, the use of concurrent reimbursement models, as 
those based on actual information on cost (risk sharing) or health status (concurrent risk 
adjustment), presents lower incentives for risk selection because payment is associated to 
actual information, but incentives for efficiency are also reduced. The same specifications for 
the model have been used only for pharmaceutical expenditures [16]. However, in this article 
we include the policy analysis for total health expenditures. 
The only use of diagnosis-based risk adjustment models does not solve the problem of risk 
selection because they do not capture within-condition variation even with concurrent 
information. Hence, following the idea in Newhouse (1996) [8] we propose the use of a hybrid 
risk adjustment model with information on health conditions different to the classification system 
used in the risk adjustment model, trying to rescue the positive properties of both prospective 
and concurrent formulae within the tradeoff between efficiency and risk selection: the hybrid 
model promotes incentives for efficiency as in the prospective model for most of the population, 
while it reduces incentives for risk selection for those patients suffering specific health 
conditions. The reimbursement associated to the second type of patients under the hybrid 
systems is set as a concurrent payment.
We utilize the set of 100 verifiable, expensive, predictive conditions (VEP100) already used and 
presented in the literature [15] in order to divide the population into two parts (one for the 
prospective payment and the other for the concurrent payment) and compare results. 
It is key to understand the appropriateness of the use of those VEP conditions. First, it is 
needed that the conditions are verifiable –which means that belonging to those categories is 
based on objective clinical measures– because we avoid the incentives in the provider of 
classifying to this set of patients simply to any patient producing expected losses. Second, 
being expensive and predictive conditions we are selecting for belonging to the group of 
concurrent payment to the type of patients that might be at risk of suffering risk selection or 
excessive risk transfer to the organization.
Provided the importance of the division of the population between the two groups, we also 
include a sensitivity analysis through the use of a different division in order to better understand 
the scope of the VEP conditions in health policy making: the division between patients suffering 7
or not at least one condition in the set of the 50 most expensive conditions within the VEP100 
conditions, which we name VEP50. 
We are using for our sample the set of VEP100 conditions presented in the literature for a U.S. 
sample. Therefore, it is needed to present an analysis validating the use of the same division of 
patients in concurrent and prospective populations within the hybrid model, because the 
characteristics of both samples might be different. 
The predictive power of risk adjustment models depends on the within-group variation in 
expected expenditures. Thus, we check for the distribution of the appearance of VEP100 
conditions under the CRG classification system and the same type of data with respect to the 
division of the population between those patients suffering or not at least one of the VEP50 
conditions. 
We provide a second analysis justifying the use of VEP conditions. We compare the relative 
cost weights of the set of patients with and without VEP100 conditions and a sensitivity analysis 
for the division using VEP50 conditions is also presented. 
In order to analyze the predictive power of the different models we use the R
2 and the predictive 
ratio. Hybrid models take into account the two sub-samples with concurrent information for 
patients with at least one VEP100 condition and prospective information for patients with no 
VEP100 condition. Therefore, in order to calculate the R
2 for hybrid models, we use the 
following methodology [15]: we first calculate the total error sum of squares for the combined 
populations (concurrent and prospective) as the error sum of squares for the concurrent 
population plus the error sum of squares from the prospective population. At the same time, the 
corrected total sum of squares is calculated as the sum of squares adjusted for the mean of the 
overall population. Finally, the R
2 is defined as one minus the ratio of the error sum of squares 
to the corrected total sum of squares. 
4. Results
Table 2 shows how in relative terms, 95% of healthy patients do not suffer any VEP100 
conditions in years 2004 and 2005, while increasing the level of severity in the CRGs supposes 
increase also the proportion of patients with at least one VEP100 condition until about 98% of 8
patients in 2004 and 99% in 1999 in the catastrophic conditions group. It is also important to 
note, that even if the proportion of patients suffering a VEP100 condition is increasing in the 
level of severity, a significant proportion of those patients – 22.72% in 2004 (2692 out of 11900) 
and 20.77% in 2005 (2657 out of 12791) – still belong to the healthy group.
With respect to the sensitivity analysis, table 3 presents the same type of data with respect to 
the division of the population between those patients suffering or not at least one of the VEP50 
conditions.
Furthermore, the analysis of the cost weights for the different subsets of patients shows (table 
4), as expected, that patients suffering at least one of the specific VEP100 conditions 
systematically present total health expenditures much higher than the rest of patients (1840.05€ 
versus 310€ in 2004 and 1954.78€ versus 331.07€ in 2005), being this different greater in the 
case of the use of VEP50 conditions.
Hence, in both analyses we conclude that the presence of VEP conditions is increasing in the 
level of severity and therefore, those conditions seem to be valid for the division of the 
population in concurrent and prospective reimbursement systems in our sample.
Different risk adjustment models for predicting total health expenditures are presented in table 
5. The information used and the predictive power found are as follows. Model 1 only includes 
demographic information and obtains an R
2 of about 0.07 (0.05 for predicting only drug 
expenditures). However, including health status information in the prospective model (models 
2), the predictive power increases until an R
2 of 0.1995 (only CRG information in model 2a), 
0.2187 (demographic and CRG information in model 2b) and 0.2473 (demographic, CRG 
information, and presence of at least one VEP100 condition in model 2c). As expected, the 
higher is the quality of the information used in the prospective model, the better is the predictive 
power (with a higher R
2), and including a dummy variable with the presence of a VEP100 
condition improves the usual prospective model of the usual risk adjustment model that uses 
the CRG classification system. Concurrent models 3a to 3c (using only CRG information, 
demographic and CRGs, or demographic, CRGs and presence of VEP100 conditions 
respectively) behaves equally and increases the proportion of explained variance to a highest 
value of R
2=0.4614 (model 3c). 9
When dividing population into two parts depending on the presence of at least one VEP100 
condition, the R
2 is of 0.1685 (model 5c) in the prospective models for patients without those 
conditions increases but is lower to that of the concurrent model for the whole population 
(0.2473 in model 2c). This means that the predictability of the cost for healthier patients 
(85.93% of the population without VEP100 conditions) is lower than that of patients with higher 
level of severity (14.07% of the population with at least one VEP100 condition). In other words, 
the asymmetry of information regarding clinical conditions of individuals is especially important 
for patients with higher level of severity which evidences the existence of incentives for risk 
selection or excessive risk transfer. The interpretation of this result is that the free variation in 
total health expenditures is specially concentrated in patients suffering one VEP100 conditions 
because most of them still belong to relatively healthy CRG categories. Concurrent models 
applied only for patients with at least one VEP100 condition improve the predictive power of 
total health expenditures (comparing models 2 with models 4) with an R
2of 0.2211 using only 
CRG information (model 4a), of 0.2300 using also demographic information (model 4b), and of 
0.4614 when using also information on the presence of VEP100 conditions (model 4c). 
We obtain an R
2 for hybrid models of 0.2006 (model 6a) using only CRG information, which is 
very similar to the predictive power of the usual prospective model using the same information 
(model 2a presented a R
2of 0.1995), and adding demographic information also present similar 
results in both purely prospective and hybrid models (R
2of 0.2187 in model 2b and of 0.2140 in 
model 6b). Therefore, having the same incentives for efficiency for most of the population 
(85.93%), focused on those individuals without VEP100 conditions, we are eliminating the 
incentives for risk selection in the population at risk of suffering such a strategy (14.07%). 
Adding information regarding the VEP conditions improves the predictive power presenting an 
R
2of 0.3571 (model 6c) higher than in the purely prospective model (model 2c). The sensitivity 
analysis provides the same exercise on the predictive models but dividing population between 
those with or without at least one of the VEP50 conditions. Thus, models 7 to 9 are analogous 
to models 4 to 6 in table 5. In this case, the proportion of the population for which efficiency 
incentives are maximized is of 90.99%, while the incentives for risk selection are eliminated for 10
the 9.01% of the population suffering at least one of the VEP50 conditions. Results in the 
sensitivity analysis confirm those already obtained. 
It is important to note as a limit for comparison with other results presented in the literature that 
our R
2 are probably higher than should be expected in other national samples. The reason is 
that all of the providers are from a narrow geographic area, and hence total health expenditures 
and practice style variations are reduced compared to other greater national samples. Besides, 
the number of parameters in the estimations (different models c) explains the high R
2obtained.
They are shown however with the aim of showing the validity of the hybrid risk adjustment tool 
with a higher level of information more than pretending to obtain a higher predictive power.
Table 6 presents the predictive ratios for the different risk adjustment models and by different 
groups of population. The validating sample is composed of nearly half of the total population, 
45142 individuals, and the proportion of population with and without VEP100 conditions varies 
slightly. Thus, in 2005 16.04% of the validating sample (6241 individuals) had at least one 
VEP100 condition and 8.87% (4002 individuals) had at least one VEP50 condition. Results 
provided by the predictive ratio analysis support those from the R
2. All models (prospective, 
concurrent, and hybrid) benefits from including a dummy variable with the presence of VEP100 
conditions. Hybrid models improve the predictive ratio for patients in most of CRG categories, 
but especially when patients are ordered by deciles of drug expenditures or by presence of 
VEP100 or VEP50 conditions. 
5. Conclusions
Mixed risk adjustment models for capitation payment have been considered by the literature as 
the appropriate approach for allocating resources. However implementation of such models 
represents a challenge because of information available and other constraints. A better 
prediction of health care expenditures for integrated care organizations allows to control for 
excessive risk transfer. Although in a private insurance market the application of risk adjustment 
supposes the transfer of financial risk, this transfer is not achieved (at least not complete) under 
a publicly funded systems. A transition to reimbursement based on risk adjustment strategies in 
publicly funded systems is therefore desirable in order to promote incentives for efficiency. 11
A mixed payment using the hybrid risk adjustment model promotes incentives for efficiency in 
the provision for a high proportion of the population through the prospective payment, but it also 
reduces excessive risk transfer to integrated care organizations through a concurrent payment 
based on actual information either on diagnosis (concurrent risk adjustment) or cost (risk 
sharing) for a determined set of patients. A key stage in the application of this hybrid model is 
the division between the set of patients with a prospective and a concurrent payment. In this 
paper we follow a methodology previously used in the literature based on the presence of 100 
verifiable, expensive and predictive conditions (VEP100) in order to be able to compare results. 
However, because our sample is different, we provide a check for the validity of the 
methodology. Furthermore, because it is not shown in the literature an optimal way of dividing 
population between the two groups with concurrent and prospective reimbursement methods, 
we provide a sensitivity analysis using only a subset of 50 conditions (VEP50) obtaining positive 
results.
The hybrid model has been shown to obtain similar or higher predictive power than purely 
prospective or concurrent risk adjustment models through the R
2, but the predictive ratio 
analysis shows how it is especially powerful at adjusting total health care expenditures for the 
set of patients at risk of suffering risk selection.
The application of risk adjustment strategies in the context of a publicly funded health system
should in the future consider the effects of incentives in the standard setting of qualities in the 
provision or times of health attendance. 12
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Age in 2004 40.20 23.17
2004 2005
Total health expenditures 513,2 559,68
Average pharmacy cost 191,33 207,86
N % N %
Gender
Males 45339 50.56 44643 50.55
Females 44328 49.44 43655 49.45
All patients with zero total health expenditure 20904 22.40 19020 20.93
All patients with zero drug expenditure 33669 37.54 32071 35.30
Patients by health conditions
Healthy with zero total health expenditure 20035 22.34 19014 20.92
Healthy with non-zero health expenditures 43539 48.55 43054 47.40
History Of Significant Acute Disease 8398 9.37 8332 9.17
Single Minor Chronic Disease 4776 5.33 5200 5.72
Minor Chronic Disease In Multiple Organ Systems 522 0.58 772 0.85
Single Dominant Or Moderate Chronic Disease 8475 9.45 9754 10.74
Significant Chronic Disease In Multiple Organ 
Systems 3050 3.40 3942 4.34
Dominant Chronic Disease In Three Or More 
Organ Systems 258 0.29 309 0.34
Dominant. Metastatic. And Complicated 
Malignancies 444 0.50 302 0.33
Catastrophic Conditions 170 0.19 170 0.1918
Table 2: Distribution of health conditions and presence of VEP100 in patients.
Patients with no 
VEP100 in 2004
Patients with at 
least one VEP100 
in 2004
Patients with no 
VEP100 in 2005
Patients with at 
least one VEP100 
in 2005 Health conditions by Clinical Risk 
Groups (highest level of aggregation)
N % by 
CRG N % by 
CRG N % by 
CRG N % by 
CRG
Healthy 60882 95.76 2692 4.24 59411 95.71 2657 4.29
History Of Significant Acute Disease 6481 77.18 1917 22.82 6383 76.61 1949 23.39
Single Minor Chronic Disease 4216 88.27 560 11.73 4536 87.23 664 12.77
Minor Chronic Disease In Multiple 
Organ Systems 436 83.53 86 16.47 625 80.96 147 19.04
Single Dominant Or Moderate Chronic 
Disease 4770 56.28 3705 43.72 5688 58.31 4066 41.69
Significant Chronic Disease In Multiple 
Organ Systems 964 31.61 2086 68.39 1382 35.05 2560 64.95
Dominant Chronic Disease In Three Or 
More Organ Systems 10 3.87 248 96.13 26 8.42 283 91.58
Dominant, Metastatic, And Complicated 
Malignancies 5 1.12 439 98.88 6 1.98 296 98.02
Catastrophic Conditions 3 1.76 167 98.24 1 0.005 169 99.9919
Table 3: Distribution of health conditions and presence of VEP50 in patients.
Patients with no 
VEP50 in 2004
Patients with at 
least one VEP50 
in 2004
Patients with no 
VEP50 in 2005
Patients with at 
least one VEP50 
in 2005 Health conditions by Clinical Risk 
Groups (highest level of aggregation)
N % by 
CRG N % by 
CRG N % by 
CRG N % by 
CRG
Healthy 61763 97.15 1811 2.85 60702 97.79 1336 2.21
History Of Significant Acute Disease 6995 83.30 1403 16.70 7201 86.43 1131 13.57
Single Minor Chronic Disease 4430 92.75 346 7.25 4903 94.28 297 5.72
Minor Chronic Disease In Multiple 
Organ Systems 476 91.19 46 8.81 699 90.55 73 9.45
Single Dominant Or Moderate Chronic 
Disease 5417 63.91 3058 36.09 7145 73.25 2609 26.75
Significant Chronic Disease In Multiple 
Organ Systems 1155 37.87 1895 62.13 1932 49.02 2010 50.98
Dominant Chronic Disease In Three Or 
More Organ Systems 14 5.42 244 94.58 42 13.59 267 86.41
Dominant, Metastatic, And Complicated 
Malignancies 65 14.64 379 85.36 37 12.26 265 87.74
Catastrophic Conditions 5 2.94 165 97.06 2 1.17 168 98.8320
Table 4: Relative cost weights for patients with and without VEP100 and VEP50 conditions
2004 2005

















Patients with no VEP100 
conditions 310.17 0.60 77767
(86.73%) 331.07 0.59 78058
(85.90%)
Patients with at least one VEP100 
condition 1840.05 3.58 11900
(13.27%) 1954.78 3.49 12791
(14.10%)
Patients with no VEP50 
conditions 329.76 0.64 80320
(89.57%) 374.03 0.66 82663  
(90.99%)
Patients with at least one VEP50 
condition 2089.53 4.07 9347
(10.43%) 2434.41 4.34 8186
(9.01%)
all patients 513.20 1.00 89667
(100%) 559.68 1.00 90849
(100%)21









patients Timing N Number of 
parameters
Model using only demographic information
M1: Only demographic information 0.0728 0.0501 100.00% Prospective 90849 12
Prospective models including diagnostic and procedures information
M2a: Only information on CRG conditions 0.1995 0.1281 100.00% Prospective 90849 82
M2b: Demographic and CRG conditions information 0.2187 0.1429 100.00% Prospective 90849 94
M2c: Demographic, CRG and existence of VEP100 information 0.2473 0.1605 100.00% Prospective 88298 194
Concurrent models including diagnostic and procedures information
M3a: Only information on CRG conditions 0.3259 0.1544 100.00% Concurrent 90849 82
M3b: Demographic and CRG conditions information 0.3336 0.1640 100.00% Concurrent 90849 94
M3c: Demographic, CRG and existence of VEP100 information 0.4614 0.3393 100.00% Concurrent 90849 194
Dividing the sample between those with and without VEP100 in 2005
M4a: Only information on CRG conditions 0.2211 0.1089 14.07% Concurrent 12791 82
M4b: Demographic and CRG conditions information 0.2300 0.1151 14.07% Concurrent 12791 94
M4c: Demographic, CRG and VEP information 0.4614 0.3393 14.45% Concurrent 12791 194
M5a: Only information on CRG conditions 0.1322 0.0861 85.93% Prospective 78058 82
M5b: Demographic and CRG conditions information 0.1603 0.1213 85.93% Prospective 78058 94
M5c: Demographic, CRG and VEP information 0.1685 0.1313 85.55% Prospective 75717 194
M6a: Hybrid Model (concurrent m4a for 14.07 and prospective m5a for 
85.93%) 0.2006 0.1040 85.93%+14.07% Hybrid 90849 82
M6b: Hybrid Model (concurrent m4b for 14.07% and prospective m5b 
for 85.93%) 0.2140 0.1164 85.93%+14.07% Hybrid 90849 94
M6c: Hybrid Model (concurrent m4c for 14.45% and prospective m5c 
for 85.55%) 0.3571 0.3018 85.55%+14.45% Hybrid 88508 194
Dividing the sample between those with at least one of the 50 VEP100 
more expensive conditions in 2005
M7a: Only information on CRG conditions 0.2003 0.0984 9.01% Concurrent 8186 82
M7b: Demographic and CRG conditions information 0.2079 0.1026 9.01% Concurrent 8186 94
M7c: Demographic, CRG and VEP information 0.4618 0.4432 9.26% Concurrent 8186 194
M8a: Only information on CRG conditions 0.1481 0.1017 90.99% Prospective 82663 82
M8b: Demographic and CRG conditions information 0.1761 0.1387 90.99% Prospective 82663 94
M8c: Demographic, CRG and VEP information 0.1855 0.1475 90.74% Prospective 80201 194
M9a: Hybrid Model (concurrent m7a for 9.01% and prospective m8a for 
90.99%) 0.1849 0.0992 90.99%+9.01% Hybrid 90849 82
M9b: Hybrid Model (concurrent m7b for 9.01% and prospective m8b 
for 90.99%) 0.1985 0.1115 90.99%+9.01% Hybrid 90849 94
M9c: Hybrid Model (concurrent m7c for 9.26% and prospective m8c for 
90.74%) 0.3800 0.3704 90.74%+9.26% Hybrid 88387 19422
Table 6: Predictive Ratios for the different risk adjustment models
Prospective models Concurrent models
Hybrid model dividing population by 
appearance of at least one VEP100 
condition in 2005
Hybrid model dividing population by 

























































total 45142 1,0431 1,0509 1,0525 1,0669 1,0223 1,0520 1,0218 1,0311 1,0312 1,0491 1,0343 1,0356 1,0433
Predictive Ratios by health conditions in 2005
Healthy 30941 2,3963 1,9527 1,8239 1,8187 1,0492 1,0469 1,0419 1,5259 1,4763 1,4898 1,6145 1,5529 1,5563
History Of Significant Acute Disease 4101 0,6037 0,6617 0,6669 0,6610 1,0267 1,0304 1,0601 0,7663 0,7662 0,8084 0,7311 0,7352 0,7276
Single Minor Chronic Disease 2533 0,9438 0,9282 0,9743 0,9732 1,0118 1,0138 1,0021 0,7866 0,8193 0,8184 0,7996 0,8379 0,8289
Minor Chronic Disease In Multiple Organ 
Systems 381 0,7600 0,7549 0,8374 0,8376 1,0302 1,0493 1,0452 0,7100 0,7612 0,7437 0,6943 0,7518 0,7368
Single Dominant Or Moderate Chronic 
Disease 4807 0,7253 0,8583 0,9173 0,9294 0,9618 0,9602 0,9993 0,8312 0,8522 0,9046 0,8135 0,8425 0,8914
Significant Chronic Disease In Multiple 
Organ Systems 1987 0,5038 0,6834 0,7395 0,7504 1,0625 1,0653 1,0012 0,9548 0,9699 0,9061 0,9039 0,9243 0,8643
Dominant Chronic Disease In Three Or 
More Organ Systems 162 0,2682 0,4425 0,4694 0,5110 0,9399 0,9410 0,9301 0,9119 0,9144 0,9041 0,8741 0,8776 0,8704
Dominant, Metastatic, And Complicated 
Malignancies 147 0,2594 0,4040 0,4324 0,4432 1,1500 1,1490 1,1685 1,1435 1,1434 1,1676 1,0929 1,0950 1,1543
Catastrophic Conditions 83 0,0603 0,8028 0,7990 0,7295 1,2804 1,2779 1,1780 1,2656 1,2627 1,1611 1,2758 1,2753 1,1551
Predictive Ratios by deciles of drug 
expenditures in 2005
decile 1 to 5 22628 9,0129 6,5030 5,8186 5,7242 3,6334 3,3458 3,2141 5,0562 4,6936 4,6816 5,3498 4,9659 4,9058
decile 6 4592 2,1210 2,2266 2,0557 2,0338 1,9852 1,9067 2,0293 1,9067 1,8019 2,0018 1,9256 1,8250 1,8172
decile 7 4455 1,5788 1,7229 1,6818 1,6405 1,6514 1,6250 1,5466 1,4896 1,4554 1,4446 1,4875 1,4641 1,4681
decile 8 4530 1,1627 1,2732 1,3030 1,2944 1,3354 1,3506 1,2813 1,1910 1,2028 1,1766 1,1726 1,1910 1,1657
decile 9 4411 0,8480 0,9130 1,0007 1,0156 1,0528 1,0945 1,1137 0,9394 0,9889 1,0196 0,9076 0,9636 1,0038
decile 10 4574 0,3101 0,4367 0,4714 0,4911 0,5604 0,6190 0,6448 0,5506 0,5696 0,5656 0,5460 0,5644 0,5597
Predictive Ratios by appearance of VEP 
procedures in 2005
no VEP100 in 2005 38901 1,5849 1,4093 1,3785 1,3595 1,1249 1,1735 0,9832 1,0276 1,0307 1,0473 1,1102 1,1107 1,1142
at least one VEP100 in 2005 6241 0,4652 0,6728 0,7097 0,7556 0,9227 0,9321 1,0633 1,0473 1,0441 1,0413 0,9639 0,9661 0,9653
no VEP50 in 2005 41140 1,4306 1,3123 1,2883 1,2727 1,1071 1,1457 1,0025 1,0640 1,0553 1,0471 1,0269 1,0298 1,0412
at least one VEP50 in 2005 4002 0,4212 0,6356 0,6792 0,7344 0,8960 0,9115 1,0534 0,9900 1,0045 1,0426 1,0591 1,0578 1,0355